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“O God! That it were possible 
To undo things done, to call back yesterday; 
That time might turn up his swift sandy glass, 
To untell the days, and to redeem these hours” 
(Hicks, 1939, Part III, front page) 
 
Introduction 
The notion of “Irrtumer in der Zeit” (errors in time) as a fundamental cause of fluctuations 
was developed by the Italian economist Marco Fanno (1933 [2007], 1931 [1993]; Caldari and 
Meacci, 2007; Arena, 1998). The same idea reappears, with a renewed emphasis on the equivalent 
expression of disappointment of expectations in a more cited article published by Hicks in the same 
year of Fanno’s 1933 article. Fanno’s and Hicks’ ideas were aimed to reach the same result, i.e. the 
explanation of macroeconomic disequilibrium, and marked a common stepping stone towards a 
revival of, and a new method for, the theory of fluctuations. This theory, which had been practiced 
and developed for a long time under the title either of “theory of crises” or of “theory of the 
business cycle”, returned to centre stage in the second half of the 20th century when the main 
interest of economists and policy-makers rather shifted towards the causes of, and the remedies for, 
the two macroeconomic evils of inflation and unemployment. The theme of expectations was taken 
up again in this revival but was confined to an analysis of the mechanisms of their formation rather 
than of their disappointment. As will be argued below, the end result of this new approach was the 
spread of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) and REH-based models by which the link 
between the disappointment of expectations and the origin of fluctuations was obscured or utterly 
ignored. 
                                                 
1 An unfinished draft of this paper was presented at the Storep Annual Conference in Rome, 1-3 June 2008, at the HES 
Annual Conference in Toronto, 27-30 June 2008 and at the Storep Workshop in Siena, 18-19 December 2009. I thank 
Katia Caldari for her collaboration in editing the early draft and for co-authoring the introduction to, and English 
translation of, Fanno’s 1933 article. I also thank the discussants assigned to the earlier drafts of this paper and two 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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The paper is divided in two Parts. The first Part is focused on the “years of high theory” 
(Shackle, 1967) and provides an examination of how the main authors of those years (Keynes, 
Hayek, Hicks) dealt with the disappointment of expectations in their theory of fluctuations. The 
second Part is focused on what may be called the “years of rational expectations” and provides an 
examination of how the main authors of these years have or have not dealt with the disappointment 
of expectations either in the context of their theory of fluctuations or out of such a context. This Part 
shows that the issue of the disappointment of expectations has been either neglected or denied by 
developing arguments based on the extrapolative expectations (EEH), adaptive expectations (AEH) 
and rational expectations hypothesis (REH); or has been silently raised behind the reconstructions 
of the Phillips curve, the aggregate supply curve and the theory of economic policy which stand for 
the leading contributions of this period.  
The paper is closed by a bird’s-eye-view and comparison of the two blocks of thought on 
expectations investigated in the two previous Parts. This view and comparison are summed up in 
the idea that the evolution of the theory of fluctuations from the years of high theory to the years of 
rational expectations relates to a body of thought that shrinks in quality while growing in size and 
complexity. This idea brings to mind Robertson’s image of the hunted hare which, once departed, 
“can be relied upon to come around to you in a circle”. This image is exploited in the final section 
to reach two conclusions. One is that the weight and noise of the hare (the size of literature) has 
increased from the first to the second period under consideration while the diameter of the circle 
(the scope of literature) was shrinking or changing shape. The other is that the demise of the REH 
and REH-based models, which seems to be taking place at the end of the second period along with 
the 2008-2009 great recession, is an implicit proof of the superiority of the theory developed in the 
first period, at least with regard to some crucial aspects of Keynes’, Hicks’, Hayek’s and Shackle’s 
contributions. These aspects are 1) the contrast between the logic of equilibrium (which is “out” of 
historical time) and the logic of fluctuations (which are “in” historical time); 2) the notions of 
“correct” and “incorrect” expectations or of “justified” and “sheer” errors; 3) the “Jevonian 
interval” and the greater relevance of the intertemporal miscoordination of plans in fixed-capital 
economies subject both to the irreversibility of investment and to the changeability of expectations; 
and finally 4) the analytical risk or impossibility of collapsing the future into the present (as done 
through the “strong” REH) and the present into the past (as done through the AEH and EEH which 
the REH was intended to replace). 
 
I. The years of high theory 
A convenient way to go into the role played by the disappointment of expectations in the 
theory of fluctuations in the years of high theory is to start from Schumpeter’s notions of Statics, 
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Dynamics and the Stationary State (1954, pp.963-71). In line with Hicks’s definition based on dated 
and non-dated variables (1939, p.115), Schumpeter defines Statics and Dynamics as two different 
methods of analysis by which all economic variables either “refer to the same point of time” or are 
influenced by “past and (expected) future values, lags, sequences, rates of change, cumulative 
magnitudes, expectations”. In this sense, the stationary state is just “an economic process that 
merely reproduces itself” and, more precisely, a methodological fiction such that “when we try to 
visualize how such a process might look and which of the phenomena of reality might be present in 
it, we ipso facto discover which of them are lacking” (ibid., p.964). If one looks into this fiction 
from the standpoint of expectations, one finds that what is lacking in it are not expectations as such. 
What is lacking is, rather, their disappointment. This is the key for grasping Schumpeter’s idea that 
Dynamics ”is practically coextensive with sequence analysis and includes period analysis as a 
special case, but it is not coextensive with the theory of economic growth or development, or 
‘progress’” (1954, p.1160)2. On the other hand, if it is true that sequence analysis “includes period 
analysis as a special case”, it follows that, unless dynamics is confined to the methodological fiction 
of the stationary state, the disappointment of expectations, including any discrepancy between ex 
ante and ex post magnitudes, is the central problem of this branch of economics as a “genuinely 
new departure” in the history of economic thought (ibidem). In the following subsections we shall 
examine how this problem was addressed, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, by the 
main authors of those years. 
 
I.1. Keynes  
The role of expectations in Keynes’ theory was first recognized by Hicks (1936) in his early review 
of the General Theory. This review is focused on expectations as the “missing element” of 
equilibrium analysis as well as on Keynes’ “method of expectations” as a device by which 
equilibrium analysis is pursued as a useful starting point for dealing with what really matters, i.e. 
disequilibrium “in the real world” (p.240). Furthermore, by connecting Keynes’ method of 
                                                 
2 On Schumpeter’s view of dynamics as distinct from Harrod’s (and others’), see ibidem, footnote 1. As for the 
distinction between “period analysis” and “sequence analysis”, it is worth recalling that this twofold approach to 
economic analysis was first developed by the Swedish economists in the 1930s as a twofold way of taking into 
consideration the consequences of any discrepancy between ex ante (planned) and ex post (realized) macroeconomic 
magnitudes (mostly saving and investment); or, which comes to the same thing, of taking into consideration the 
consequences, at the end of a given period (according to period analysis) or from period to period (according to 
sequence analysis), of the (ex post) disappointment of the expectations formed (ex ante) at the beginning of any period. 
See, in this connection, Myrdal (1939 [1965]), Lindahl (1939 [1970]), Ohlin (1937) and, again, Schumpeter (1954, pp. 
494-6). See, in particular, Lundberg (1955 [1964]) and his Swedish-Austrian view of the link between the 
disequilibrium resulting from the disappointment of the expectations formed at the beginning of a given period and the 
disequilibria resulting, across a number of different periods, from the disappointment of the expectations running at the 
inception of a roundabout method of production (involving the employment of fixed capital for a large number of 
periods). This approach is particularly helpful in dealing with the impact of the disappointment of expectations on the 
“Jevonian interval” to be discussed below.  
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expectations to the method of the Swedish economists (based as it was on “period analysis” and 
“sequence analysis” as well as on the related distinction between ex ante and ex post), Hicks’ 
review introduced the idea that this method would make no sense if expectations were fulfilled all 
the time, i.e. if no disappointment would ever occur. The link between the method of expectations 
detected by Hicks and the method of the Swedish economists was never admitted by Keynes3. Yet 
the need for such a link is implicit in the early chapters of the General Theory. These chapters are 
concerned with the concepts of aggregate income, saving and investment as flows that take place in 
a given period. Keynes’ wording of his arguments, however, makes it unclear whether he accepts or 
rejects the ex-ante/ex-post approach to the study of such flows and, therefore, of expectations 
themselves, the nature of which is that they are formed at the beginning of a period and turn out to 
be either fulfilled or disappointed at the end of it.  
Take, for instance, chapters 3 and 5. After basing his “aggregate supply function” on the proceeds 
expected by entrepreneurs from a given level of employment and after distinguishing between 
“short-term” and “long-term” expectations, Keynes points out that “the actually realized results” of 
the production and sale of aggregate output will only be relevant to employment in so far as they 
cause a modification of “subsequent expectations” and also that “a change in expectations” will 
produce its full effect on employment only “over a considerable period” (p.47, Keynes’ italics). 
Furthermore, the repercussions resulting from the process of revision of short-term expectations are 
examined in chapter 5 in a manner that conforms not only to the method of sequence analysis 
developed by the Swedish economists but also to a view of time-consuming production that 
conforms to the Austrian tradition4.  
Now take chapters 6 and 7. Here Keynes’ method of analysis changes to the extent that not 
only the logic of these initial chapters but also the consistency of the whole theory built upon them 
is potentially undermined. Chapter 7, for instance, is devoted to showing that saving and investment 
                                                 
3 Of course, Keynes was not unaware of the method of the Swedish economists, especially after their publications were 
made available in English. In his replies to Ohlin's criticisms, however, Keynes first admitted that he should “certainly 
give further thoughts to the advantages” of the Swedish method and that he had given it up “owing to my failure to 
establish any definite unit of time” for carrying it out (Collected Writings, Vol. XIV, p.184) while, on the other hand, he 
promised a future article “dealing with the relation of the ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ analysis in its entirety to the analysis in 
my General Theory” (1937a, p.663, italics added; see also 1937b, p.241, footnote 2). Other fragmentary views of the ex 
ante/ex post analysis can be found in Keynes' Collected Writings, Vol. XIV, pp.179-201. 
 
4 This is confirmed at the beginning of chapter 5 where Keynes argues that the importance of expectations in 
determining the volume of output “in the real world” is necessitated by the plain fact of time-consuming production 
(1936, p.46) as well as in the middle of the same chapter where he points out 1) that it is current, not past, expectations 
that are relevant in determining the volume of output; and 2) that the process of their revision differs depending on 
whether it comes to short-term expectations (in which case the revision is “gradual and continuous, carried out largely 
in the light of realized results”) or to long-term expectations (in which case the revision is rather sudden and violent) 
(ibid., pp.50-51). Concerning the differences between the Treatise and the General Theory, Keynes eventually admits 
that in his former book he did not “distinguish clearly between expected and realized results” and that his method there 
was to regard current realized profit as determining the current expectation of profit (ibid., p.77). 
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are necessarily and identically equal. Taking it in its ex-post dimensions, this argument is 
indubitable. But, as Shackle asks, does this argument also imply something about a coherence of 
intentions? If not, what is the mechanism by which a possible disagreement between ex ante 
(aggregate) saving and ex ante (aggregate) investment is corrected into an ex post equality? This is, 
after all, what one would expect from a general theory. For what such a theory should also show is 
“how the interpretation of given conduct, by those who decide upon and perform it, alters as these 
acts pass from design to actuality in circumstances not successfully foreseen, and how the acts 
themselves are perhaps revised in the course of performance” (Shackle, 1967, p.148)5:  
The ambiguities of these initial chapters are overcome, however, in those crucial parts of the 
General Theory which are focused, directly or indirectly, on the precariousness of long-term 
expectations and on the readjustments resulting from their revision. These parts begin with chapter 
12 and continue well into the end of the book. They are based on the idea that this revision accounts 
for the shifts of the curves for the marginal efficiency of capital and liquidity preference; and 
therefore of aggregate investment, the “flighty bird” of macroeconomics6. The importance of these 
shifts is best conveyed by Shackle’s view of the former curve as “a tree-branch in a gale, sweeping 
up and down with the gusts of politics and of the emerging consequences of past action”, and of the 
latter curve as “a thread floating in a gusty wind, continually liable to change its form not only 
because of ‘the news’, but even because of a change in the total quantity of money itself” (1967, 
p.151 and p.217). The impact of (a disappointment of) long-term expectations on (shifts of) the 
curves for the marginal efficiency of capital and for liquidity-preference corresponds to Keynes’ 
insight that both durable equipment in the former case and money in the latter can be equally 
                                                 
5 Keynes’ failure to argue in terms of discrepancies between ex-ante and ex-post magnitudes led Ohlin (1937, p.237) to 
regard him as an old-fashioned “equilibrium theorist”. Ohlin’s overall treatment of this issue, however, ends up in a 
mistake much deeper than Keynes’ omission or ambiguities. This mistake consists in regarding ex-ante saving and ex-
ante investment as two schedules showing how much people are willing to save and to invest at different hypothetical 
rates of interest. The mistake consists in smuggling the static method underlying the neoclassical (micro) analysis of 
demand and supply into the (new) dynamic method underlying the Swedish (macro) analysis of ex ante and ex post. 
Hence Haberler’s observation that, by identifying the ex ante magnitudes with the alternative plans embodied in those 
(instantaneous) schedules rather than with the aggregate plans existing at the beginning of a period, “it is difficult to see 
how Ohlin can speak of people being disappointed by events going contrary to their plans” (1946, pp.190-191). 
 
6 Keynes’ view of the links between (changes in) long-term expectations, (shifts of) the marginal efficiency of capital, 
(changes in) aggregate investment and (changes in) aggregate output provides the framework in which expectations and 
their disappointment are dealt with in this paper. Such a framework is designed to deal with expectations (and errors) 
that prevail in the economy as a whole, i.e. with collective or average expectations, rather than with the expectations 
(and errors) that prevail in the economy of a particular individual or of individuals engaged in a particular market or 
sector. This approach, it should be noted, need not coincide with the approach sometimes practiced by those very 
authors (such as Hayek and Hicks to be discussed below) who have dealt with expectations and their disappointment at 
the aggregate level. Although there are circumstances in which these authors appear to be dealing with the equilibration 
of prices in a microeconomic context rather than with the fluctuations of aggregate output, it should be noted that these 
two sets of problems are not independent from one another, however different the publications or years in which they 
have been tackled even by a single author. Some links can indeed be established between them. This is what will be 
argued below with regard to Hayek’s implicit or explicit treatment of expectations, and to Hicks’ treatment of changes 
in the price-expectations of one ‘week’ and in the output of the following ‘weeks’. 
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considered to be a link by which the economic future is connected to the present (1936, p.146 and 
p.293)7. 
Whatever the consistency between Keynes’ initial chapters on static notions and his final 
chapters on their dynamic implications and however founded Ohlin’s criticisms of Keynes' overall 
shortcomings may be, a common void seems to affect the analysis of both authors. This void, to be 
partly shared by Hicks and partly filled by Hayek, consists in the failure to distinguish between the 
disequilibria originated by the current and those originated by the intertemporal incompatibility or 
miscoordination of expectations. As we shall see below, “period analysis” is as necessary to the 
study of the former incompatibility as “sequence analysis” is to the study of the latter. The latter, we 
shall also see, is most necessary when it comes to fixed-capital economies, i.e. to economies whose 
levels of employment and output depend on investments made in a more or less distant past and 
designed to bear fruit into a more or less distant future. 
 
I.2. Hayek  
The role of expectations in determining the volume of aggregate output and of their 
disappointment in determining the fluctuations of this volume along with other macroeconomic 
variables is not as explicit in Hayek’s work as it is in Keynes’. On one occasion, however, Hayek 
rejected Myrdal’s allegation that in his theory of the trade cycle “there is no room for the role 
played by expectations” (1939, p.155). Indeed, one should distinguish Hayek’s early article on 
intertemporal equilibrium (1928 [1984]), where the disappointment of expectations is implicitly 
excluded, from his subsequent works on fluctuations (1931, 1933, 1937, 1939, 1941), where that 
disappointment is implicitly included. Before going into the latter aspect, it should be noted that 
there is some consistency in this oscillation. For, following Schumpeter’s insight on the 
methodological fiction of the stationary state, Hayek’s 1928 article may be regarded as an a-
contrario introduction to what really matters, i.e. to the “phenomena which are lacking” in the 
fiction of intertemporal equilibrium8. The fluctuations of output are among these phenomena. And 
                                                 
7 Keynes’ recognition of this link is a proof that the analysis of (static) equilibrium under given expectations and the 
analysis of (dynamic) disequilibrium under changing expectations consistently coexist, in spite of the ambiguities 
mentioned above, as two branches (the static and the dynamic) of his theory that lend to it “an exceptional power to 
combine reasoning and realism” (Shackle, 1967, p.222). An echo of these two branches can be found in Kregel’s 
interpretation of the General Theory (1976, p.209) as a system based on three models centred respectively on the 
notions of “static equilibrium” (short-term and long-term expectations are never disappointed), “stationary equilibrium” 
(short-term expectations are, while long-term expectations are not, disappointed) and “shifting equilibrium” (both short-
term and long-term expectations are disappointed and curves shift). However, the idea that Keynes’ central emphasis is 
neither on expectations as such nor on their disappointment seems to contradict Keynes’ assertion that the aggregate 
supply and demand functions (as distinct from the effective demand resulting from their intersection) are based on the 
expectations of entrepreneurs (1936, chapter 3; see also Collected Writings, Vol. XIV, p.179). 
 
8 The compatibility between Hayek’s 1928 paper on intertemporal equilibrium and Hayek’s subsequent works on 
fluctuations is supported by the opening assertions of that paper that “all economic activity is carried out through time” 
and that equilibrium analysis provides “no more than a partial explanation of what goes on in the economy as it actually 
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since expectations may be explicitly included in an intertemporal equilibrium model only if they are 
never revised or disappointed over an unlimited sequence of dates, it follows that their revision or 
disappointment is at the roots of intertemporal disequilibrium, i.e. of fluctuations. This can be 
realized if one starts from the idea that in the Prices and Production model (1931 [1935]) 
“monetary factors cause the cycle but real phenomena constitute it” and that amongst the real 
phenomena of this model are changes in relative prices and in the expectations associated with them 
(Machlup, 1976, p.23)9. For what is set in motion by the credit expansion (money creation) 
contemplated in this model is, first, the (ill-founded) expectation that the expansion of the capital-
goods sector will find support in the real economy and, secondly, the following (unavoidable) 
realization that this expectation was founded on errors (disappointment), the result being that the 
structure of production, which had been “misdirected” in the ascending phase of the cycle, is then 
brought back to its initial conditions10. This self-reversing process is all the more effective the 
larger the number of entrepreneurs crowding the “Jevonian interval” (Garrison, 1989), i.e. the larger 
the number of individuals exposed to errors in time and the larger the number of stages into which 
that “interval” is divided. 
The role of the disappointment of expectations as a cause of fluctuations is brought to a clearer light 
in Hayek’s famous Copenhagen lecture (1933). Among the insights of this lecture is the distinction 
between “justified” and “sheer” errors (1933, p.141) as well as the notion, in the case of justified 
errors, of correct (and, by implication, incorrect) expectations, depending on whether everybody’s 
expectations do (or, by implication, do not) incorporate all the available information. This 
distinction is further developed in Economics and Knowledge (1937). By showing the different 
nature of the errors committed by different individuals at a particular date versus the errors 
committed by all the members of a community from one date to another, Hayek brings here to light 
the different nature of the current miscoordination of expectations (resulting from the different 
                                                                                                                                                                  
exists”. This complies with Hayek’s later admission that “the situation seems here to be that, before we can explain why 
people commit mistakes, we must first explain why they should ever be right” (1937, p.33; see also 1941, p.17).  
 
9 This conforms to Hicks’s assertion that in Hayek’s 1931 model “price-expectations are not introduced explicitly, for in 
1930 their day had not yet come” but also that there must have been “some implicit assumption” about them (1967, 
p.206). By arguing that this implicit assumption is that relative prices are constant and by adding that their flexibility is 
the mechanism by which the disequilibrium triggered by credit expansion is transmitted to the real economy through 
lags, Hicks implies that not only expectations but, indeed, their disappointment is at the roots of the fluctuations 
depicted in that model. The implicit role played by expectations in this transmission mechanism is eventually revealed 
by Hayek’s treatment of money as a “loose joint” between demand and supply both in the market for money and in the 
market for saving (1941, Part IV, chapter XXVIII). 
 
10 The changes in the structure of production and in the composition of output resulting from errors in time coincide 
with Haberler’s “vertical” and “horizontal” maladjustments (1946, chapters 3 and 4). By associating horizontal 
maladjustments with what he calls “error theories” (these errors being those relating to forecasts of final demand), 
however, Haberler fails to see that errors lie at the roots of both kinds of maladjustment, the major difference being that, 
whereas in the case of vertical maladjustments these errors have an impact on the whole economy, in the other case they 
are mostly responsible for the fluctuations only of the particular firms or industries in which these errors occur. 
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knowledge available to each individual within a particular period) versus the intertemporal 
miscoordination of aggregate expectations (including those resulting from the ex-ante/ex-post 
discrepancies discussed above). Hence Hayek’s emphasis on the difference (to be neglected, as we 
shall see, in the years of rational expectations) between the ‘data’ (sets of knowledge) that are 
“supposed to be given to the observing economist” and those that are supposed to be given “to the 
persons whose actions he wants to explain”. This emphasis goes hand in hand with Hayek’s further 
distinction, within the latter set of data, between changes in ‘objective’ data and changes in 
‘subjective’ data (i.e. in expectations). From that emphasis and this distinction comes Hayek’s 
treatment of change as “a change of data in our sense, that is a change relative to expectations” 
(irrespective, that is, of any alteration in ‘objective data’) (ibid., p.40). This twofold approach to 
change eventually supports Hayek’s view that the theory of fluctuations cannot do without the 
theory of capital and that both theories cannot do without a theory of individual behaviour. For an 
economy is all the more subject to an intertemporal miscoordination of expectations (or to an 
intertemporal change in ‘subjective data’) and to the resulting fluctuations the greater the “Jevonian 
interval”, i.e. the degree of roundaboutedness or the amount of fixed capital employed in the 
production of aggregate output. In particular, the greater the amount of fixed capital (the greater the 
degree of roundaboutedness), the more subject is a capital-using economy to the consequences of 
“sheer errors”. For, unlike “justified errors” which reflect some miscoordination between the 
intentions of different individuals within the current period (whatever the amount of fixed capital 
inherited from past periods), “sheer errors” reflect the intertemporal mismatch between the 
proportions in which the entrepreneurs of the current period plan their investments for the current 
and future periods (i.e. their demand for capital in different periods) and the proportions in which 
the consumers of future periods will divide their income between consumption and provision for 
further consumption (i.e. their supply of savings) in each of those future periods11.  
The role of equilibrium in time, the difficulty of achieving it in an economy where 
knowledge is dispersed amongst different individuals and where a shock promotes the 
disappointment of the expectations shared by all individuals receives in The Pure Theory of Capital 
(1941, especially Parts II and III)12 a greater attention than in Hayek’s previous works. The 
                                                 
11 It must be noted that the verbs and tenses used in the text above do not coincide exactly with those actually adopted in 
Hayek’s. For Hayek makes it unclear whether the coordination is current, i.e. related to a given period, or 
intertemporal, i.e. related to a set of successive periods. It should also be noted, however, that Hayek’s ambiguities 
never go so far as to include the mix-up (noticed in the years of high theory) between expectations (which include a 
project or plan) and forecasts (which do not). See, in this connection, Hayek’s observation above on the difference 
between the “observing economist” and the “persons whose actions he wants to explain”. 
 
12 While Part II is focused on the expectations and plans of a single mind (the central planner) at a point in time and, 
therefore, on the necessary compatibility of these expectations and plans, Part III is focused on the expectations and 
plans of a multitude of individuals (free-market economy) and, therefore, on the possible incompatibility of the 
independent plans of all these individuals.  
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complexity of this theme is here enhanced by Hayek's treatment of the case of an unforeseen event 
that hits a fixed-capital economy. This case is based about the assumption that “some persons 
suddenly decide to consume less” (1941, p.272); i.e. about the assumption of an unforeseen change 
in saving13. In this case, as Hayek argues, “it makes little difference whether we assume that the 
unforeseen event occurs quite unexpectedly or whether we assume that its imminence becomes 
known some time after the investment has been made” (1941, p.306, italics added). By splitting his 
argument in two parts depending on whether the unforeseen saving of the current period exceeds or 
falls short of what was expected when a multi-period investment was decided in a previous period, 
and by concluding that, in the case of an unexpected excess, the result is “a temporary accumulation 
of stocks of consumer goods”, Hayek implies an intertemporal (rather than current) incompatibility 
of plans (expectations). This incompatibility stems from a lack of “correspondence between 
individual intentions” not within a single period (sometimes identified by Hayek as one month, 
1941, p.23 and p.254) but over a certain set of successive periods. Hayek’s argument, however, is 
not without ambiguities. The notion of equilibrium, for instance, is initially referred (in an implicit 
context of period analysis) to “a state of complete compatibility of ex ante plans” (1941, p.23) but is 
eventually re-utilized (in an implicit context of sequence analysis) to discuss the disruption that 
occurs once the (saving) plans of one period turn out to contradict the (investment) plans of 
previous periods14.  
 
I.3. Hicks  
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
13 This case, which Hayek (1941, p.272) draws from Bresciani Turroni and Strigl, is nothing but the case first examined 
by Fanno (1931, 1933). Both Hayek and Fanno look at the unforeseen change as hitting a time-consuming economy 
divided in at least two sectors (consumption goods and capital goods) and in such a manner that the sudden fall in 
consumption “cannot affect the relative quantities of the two kinds of goods available” at the time of the fall. It is worth 
noting that the issue of the specificity versus mobility of capital goods is raised by Hayek in this connection (1941, 
Chapters XXIII and XXIV). For what this issue implies is that the more irreversible is current investment and the longer 
its actual life the more will the economy suffer from the intertemporal miscoordination or disappointment of 
expectations. 
 
14 Thus Hayek fails to develop some arguments that would have thrown further light or coherence on other parts of his 
theory. He fails, for instance, to clarify 1) that what the case of unforeseen saving is concerned with is nothing but the 
intertemporal disappointment of expectations; 2) that this special kind of miscoordination is all the more likely and 
relevant the more “fixed” is the capital employed in production or, which comes to the same, the longer is the “Jevonian 
interval”; and finally 3) that “it makes little difference” (to use Hayek’s expression above with regard to Parts II and III 
of his 1941 book) whether the economy affected by this special kind of miscoordination is a free-market or a centrally-
planned economy in that both kinds of economy are subject to “sheer” errors. This failure seems to reflect a more 
general neglect for the difference between the two notions of time that intersect the Austrian theory, old and new; i.e. 
the notion of “time as a container” (which properly underlies Hayek's theory of fluctuations) and the notion of “time as 
an ingredient” (which underlies Böhm-Bawerk's theory of capital) (Meacci, 1994). The overlapping of the different 
contexts resulting from these notions conceals what Hicks (1956, p.221) ambiguously calls the “central dynamic issue” 
of modern theory, i.e. “how to superimpose the pattern of change, which is one time-pattern, upon the underlying 
pattern of capital-using production, which is another”. 
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Hicks’s analysis of expectations, of their disappointment and of their impact on fluctuations is most 
evident in his initial (1933) and final (1939) contribution to the years of high theory. These 
contributions hinge on the initial assertions that “the condition for equilibrium is perfect foresight”, 
that “disequilibrium is the disappointment of expectations” and that “a real economy is always in 
disequilibrium” (Hicks, 1933, p.32)15. These assertions reveal some links not only with the ex-
ante/ex-post approach and its implications in terms of expectations disappointed or fulfilled, but 
also with some aspects of Keynes’ and Hayek’s approach to the problem of fluctuations. These 
links have been admitted by Hicks himself when, concerning his 1936 review of the General 
Theory and his disentanglement of Keynes’ “method of expectations” from Keynes’ “special 
theory” of employment, he acknowledges that it was the method of the Swedish economists which 
led him to detect that method in Keynes’ book (Hicks, 1973, p.8, note 4); and when, concerning his 
late remake of the “Hayek story” (Hicks, 1967), he eventually brings to light the implicit role of 
expectations, and of their disappointment, in the origin and evolution of that “story”. Finally, and 
most importantly, Keynes’ and Hayek’s joint influence on Hicks is also discernible behind his later 
insights on the epistemological difference between economics of time, economics in time and 
economics out of time (Hicks, 1976). It is this difference that supports Hicks’ view of Keynes’s 
theory as a theory that “has one leg which is in time, but another which is not” (ibid., p.269). While 
maintaining, as Shackle would, that the leg which is in time revolves around the concepts of 
marginal efficiency of capital and liquidity preference, Hicks implies in two different periods of his 
life (1936, 1976) that Keynes is along with Hayek one of the pioneers of economics in time. Since, 
however, Hicks believes that it is the “method of expectations” (in the sense discussed above) that 
supports the leg of Keynes’s theory which is in time, one can eventually realize what is only 
implicit in that belief, namely that the disappointment of expectations is the unrecognized “knee” of 
this leg. 
Hicks’ twofold interaction with Hayek and Keynes is most evident, however, in the initial 
chapters of Part III of Value and Capital (1939). Here it is argued 1) that the stationary state is an 
evasion from the “main crux” of Dynamics, namely from the divergence between prices expected 
(in the past) and prices realized (in the present) as well as between current prices and expected 
                                                 
15 These assertions have been related by Hicks (1991, pp.371-2) to Hayek’s 1928 notion of equilibrium and to the 
“criterion for non-distortion” implicit in this notion. This criterion might be regarded as a benchmark for identifying a 
contrario what might be called the “criterion for distortion” which is needed when it comes to the analysis of real-world 
economies. This criterion calls for the acknowledgment of the role played in fluctuations by disappointment of 
expectations. Concerning the link between this disappointment and money as a store of value as well as the parallel link 
between Hicks and Keynes on these matters, see Hicks (1933 and 1973). On Hicks’ lifelong interest for the role of 
historical time, see Leijonhufvud (1984). Finally, Hicks’ familiarity with Fanno’s 1931 and 1933 articles is proved by 
his quotation from the former, and citation of the latter, article in the final footnote of his own 1933 article. This 
footnote was abolished in the 1980 translation and reprint of this article (see Hicks’ introduction to a further reprint in 
1933 [1981-1983], Vol. II, Chapter 3). 
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prices; 2) that one thing is “equilibrium over time” (in which no mistakes are ever committed and 
plans continue to be executed without revisions) while another thing is “temporary equilibrium” 
(which holds on the Monday of each ‘week’ and  is disrupted by the conditions that may occur on 
the Monday of the following ‘week’); 3) that disequilibrium is accordingly the prevailing condition 
of an economy in time, the degree of this disequilibrium depending on the extent to which 
“expectations are cheated, and plans go astray”; and finally 4) that a “Futures Economy” (in which 
“people would be under contract to buy or sell certain goods on the second Monday”) can indeed 
remove “inconsistency disequilibrium”, i.e. the disequilibrium resulting from the inconsistency of 
current plans, though it cannot remove the disequilibrium resulting from unexpected change (for in 
this case all the people “might be unwilling or unable to buy or sell the amounts of goods contracted 
for”) (ibid., Chapter X).  
These two kinds of disequilibrium, i.e. the one that can and the one that cannot be removed 
in a “Futures Economy”, are the result, it should be noted, of respectively the “current” and the 
“intertemporal” miscoordination of expectations (plans) or, in Hayek's terms, of “justified” and 
“sheer” errors discussed above. This second kind of miscoordination and errors cannot be properly 
tackled, however, within the confines of period analysis and of its central notion of “temporary 
equilibrium”. Indeed, in spite of Hicks’ final admission that “the consequences of accumulation or 
decumulation of capital” must be studied in the context of a number of successive periods and 
belong to a part of dynamics “which falls outside temporary equilibrium theory” (1939, chapter 
XXIII), and in spite of the numerous revisions and self-criticisms produced throughout his life, 
Hicks never went far enough to develop the dynamic parts of his 1939 book in the direction of 
tackling the “ultimate dynamic problem” (as he calls it in chapter XX of that book). This problem is 
posed by the disequilibria resulting in future 'weeks' from the disappointment of the expectations 
held on the Monday of any initial 'week' and can be tackled, therefore, only by resorting to the 
method of sequence analysis. Yet, when he eventually came back to the dynamic parts of Value and 
Capital and to the Swedish method, Hicks confined his remarks to the simple argument that the 
“single-period theory” developed by the Swedish economists (in particular by Lindahl) was framed 
in terms of fixed prices with ex ante demands and supplies not necessarily equal (in terms, that is, of 
what Hicks calls the “fixprice method”) whereas his Value and Capital “single-period theory” was 
framed in terms of flexible prices with ex ante demands and supplies necessarily equal (in terms, 
that is, of what Hicks calls the “flexprice method”) (Hicks, 1956, p.224)16. 
                                                 
16 Hicks' last-ditch defence of his Value and Capital dynamic method is not enough, however, to deflect from it the 
criticism that he himself eventually raised against  Keynes’ theory as an “inherently short-sighted” theory (Hicks, 1985, 
p.60). Short-sighted, it should be noted, in the sense that this theory, being confined to a concept of equilibrium 
“restricted to the determination of employment within the period that is under consideration, taking that period by itself” 
(1985, p.59-60), is a “single-period theory” rather than a “continuation theory” (1956, p.223); it is, in other words, a 
theory based on what happens in a given period rather than on what happens in successive periods once the expectations 
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II. The years of rational expectations  
While the economists of the years of high theory came to the theme of expectations in view 
of the impact of their disappointment upon macroeconomic equilibrium over time or upon 
disequilibrium and fluctuations, the economists of the second half of the 20th century re-focused 
their attention on the same theme with the initial aim of putting forward a specific hypothesis or 
formula for the mechanism by which (aggregate) expectations are formed17. This hypothesis or 
formula was then used to develop new theories or models in contrast with, or in support of, the 
main arguments sometimes of the “economics of Keynes” and sometimes of “Keynesian 
economics” (Leijohnhufvud, 1968). One important difference between these two sets of arguments 
is that expectations play the role we have seen in the former and scarcely any role at all in the latter 
set18. The main hypotheses formulated along the new trend have been the extrapolative expectations 
hypothesis (EEH), the adaptive expectations hypothesis (AEH) and the rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH)19. If only because the aim of these hypotheses was to focus on the mechanisms of 
expectations formation rather than on their disappointment in time, the resulting models were to 
reach a unifying climax either in an explicit neglect of the macroeconomic consequences of that 
disappointment or in an implicit acknowledgement of this phenomenon in the main theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of this period are revised or disappointed. It is not by chance, therefore, that chapter 6 of Methods of Dynamic 
Economics (1985, pp.52-61) is titled by Hicks “The Methods of Keynes” (methods, that is, in the plural and in contrast 
with the method, in the singular, attributed to Keynes in Hicks’s early review of the General Theory). For a similar view 
of Keynes’s “hybrid” theory, see above Shackle’s criticism of Keynes’s neglect of the ex ante-ex post distinction. 
 
17 The focus on the mechanism by which (collective) expectations are formed -rather than on the impact that these 
expectations, once and however formed, have on fluctuations- creates a wedge between the ex-ante/ex-post formulation 
and the Adaptive Expectations Hypothesis (AEH). For the Swedish approach was not concerned with how expectations 
are formed once errors are recognized “in time”, i.e. as a period of any length comes to an end (a lapse of time is always 
necessary for errors to be recognized by those who have committed them). What this approach is concerned with is 
rather how expectations, once and however formed, lead -if fulfilled- to macroeconomic equilibrium and -if 
disappointed- to disequilibrium and fluctuations. 
 
18 For an overview of the snowballing literature on the economics of Keynes, Keynesian economics, Old and New 
Classical economics, Old and New monetarism, New and Post-Keynesian economics and many other divisions, 
conflicts and transformations of modern macroeconomics, see Snowdon and Vane (2004). See also Phelps (1990). 
 
19 While the EEH is based on the idea that the expected value of a variable for a given period is determined by changes 
in the actual level of this variable in two or more previous periods  (see, to begin with, Metzler, 1941),  the AEH takes 
into account not only the actual values and changes observed in past periods but also any difference between the actual 
values observed in past periods and the values previously expected for these periods (see, to begin with, Cagan, 1956). 
As for the REH, this hypothesis assumes, contrary to the backward-looking bias of the other two, that expectations are 
formed on the basis of the information available now and of the prediction of relevant economic theory (see, to begin 
with, Muth, 1961). Amongst the implications of the REH, which has proved to be the most sophisticated and practiced 
of these three hypotheses, is the idea that, if the theory is right, expectations are necessarily fulfilled as well as the idea 
that, if theoreticians believe in the validity of their theory, they must also believe in the validity of the REH. For a 
complete account of the REH and REH-based models in the years of rational expectations, see Pesaran (1989), Hoover 
(1992) and others. For a view of the REH as incompatible with Hicks’s view of “temporary equilibrium” (based as the 
latter is on the possibility of the disappointment of expectations from one ‘week’ to another), see Farmer (1999, p.89). 
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constructions of the new period. Among these constructions is the expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve, the misperceptions-augmented aggregate supply curve and the policy-ineffectiveness 
propositions. These constructions will be examined in what follows in the light of the advances 
promoted by the main authors of the years of high theory. 
 
II.1. The expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
A major difference between the three hypotheses on expectations formation mentioned 
above is that, while the EEH and the REH do not take into account the possibility of errors in time, 
the AEH does allow for this possibility to the extent that it is also known as a “learning-from-
errors” or an “errors-correcting” hypothesis. It is ironic to note, however, that the AEH inclusion of 
these errors, though aimed to cripple those branches of “Keynesian economics” which, due to their 
lack of attention for the role of expectations, were far away from the spirit and letter of the 
“economics of Keynes”, was eventually re-utilized in promoting the abandonment of the former to 
the advantage of the latter approach to economics.  
The old Phillips curve is a case in point. When Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968) launched 
their critique and, in hindsight, the reconstruction of this curve, they resorted, in spite of their 
different terminology, to the role played in its transformation by “errors in time” and the 
disappointment of expectations. The main difference between the new approach and the approach 
that carried the way in the 1930s relates to the object of these errors as well as to the set of agents 
who are most prone to them. While this object was in most contributions of the 1930s the ex ante/ex 
post discrepancies between saving and investment (entrepreneurs being the agents most exposed to 
these errors), in the modern revival of the theory of fluctuations the object has become the 
expected/actual rate of inflation (workers rather than entrepreneurs being now the agents most 
prone to committing the errors). Moreover, while the force lying behind the errors committed by 
entrepreneurs may be thought to be, for instance, their “animal spirits” (via shifts of the propensity 
to invest facing a constant propensity to save) (Keynes, 1936, Ch.12), the force lying behind the 
errors committed by workers is more likely to be their “money illusion” (via the belief that a change 
in money wages involves an equivalent change in real wages). Hence the idea of the “augmented” 
Phillips curve. This “augmentation” implies that there are as many possible curves as expected rates 
of inflation and that any actual curve relating to a given expected rate is to shift upwards once 
workers realize that they have been “fooled”. This signifies the disappointment of their expectations 
once the rate of inflation expected when contracting nominal wages turns out to fall short of the rate 
of inflation experienced at the end of the contracting period. The AEH is at the core of this 
argument in the sense that workers are assumed to adjust (i.e. to revise upwards or downwards) 
their inflation expectations at the beginning of a period by at least a fraction of the forecast errors 
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committed in previous periods. The final result is known: the inflation-unemployment trade-off 
along the short-run Phillips curve is dissolved into a combination of rising inflation rates with a 
constant rate of unemployment at its “natural” level along a long-run vertical line. This implies that 
only when unemployment is at its natural level expectations are fulfilled; and, accordingly, that 
when unemployment falls short of, or exceeds, its natural level, the expectations running at the 
beginning of a period are disappointed and revised at the end of it. In such a framework, the 
disappointment of expectations reappears as the root cause of the impossibility of keeping not only 
the “market” rate of unemployment below (or above) its “natural” rate (in the case of workers’ 
expectations of inflation) but also the “money” rate of interest below (or above) its “natural” rate (in 
the case of people’s expectations of inflation). It is understood that this impossibility becomes 
manifest only after the period has run its course and only in the absence of accelerating inflation, 
i.e. of a situation in which people keep being “fooled” over an unlimited number of periods20.  
Not that the old Phillips curve be devoid of any meaning. Given the difference between a 
static (stationary) and a dynamic context, one can still argue that the old Phillips curve might well 
fit a static context (a context, it should be noted, in which expectations are given and fulfilled) 
though it cannot fit at all the dynamic context. The trouble is that this context –and the dynamic 
method introduced in the 1930s for dealing with it- is the context that must be adopted in economic 
analysis when it comes to the problems of the real world (unemployment being one of these 
problems) and, even more so, when it comes to the policy measures needed to solve these problems 
(a most important task initially assigned to the Phillips curve). Unfortunately, the disappointment of 
expectations is one of the problems that cannot be avoided in the real world. Even more 
unfortunately, this problem cannot be solved by relying on the static method. 
 
II.2. The misperceptions-augmented aggregate supply curve 
We have hinted above at the ambiguities incorporated in the initial chapters of the General 
Theory. Among these ambiguities is Keynes’ “Aggregate Supply Function” by which the proceeds 
(net of user cost) expected by entrepreneurs from a given volume of output are related to the 
employment associated with this output (1936, chapter 3). These ambiguities may be responsible 
for the conflicting interpretations of that function in the 1950s and 1960s as well as for the 
                                                 
20 Hence Friedman’s distinction between a rising rate of inflation (which implies the disappointment of the expectations 
based on past inflation) and a high rate (which is assumed to be constant and can be easily anticipated) and his final 
conclusion that “a rising rate of inflation may reduce unemployment, a high rate will not” (1968, p.11). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the relation between natural and actual magnitudes in the light of optimal policy rules, see 
Woodford’s neo-Wicksellian model in Woodford (2003). It can however be noted that the “explosive spiral” in which 
Woodford summarizes Friedman’s Wicksellian view of the “cumulative process” triggered by a low interest-rate peg is 
the result of expectations that are continuously disappointed upwards rather than self-fulfilled from one round of 
inflation to another. 
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replacement of this function by the similar, but by no means identical, “aggregate supply curve” 
that followed suit. While Keynes' function was drawn in the Z,N plane (Z being the proceeds and N 
the employment level) with expectations explicitly, though not unambiguously, included in the 
proceeds, the new curve is universally drawn in the P,Q plane (P being the hypothetical price level 
and Q the actual aggregate output) as an “augmentation” of the horizontal aggregate supply curve 
(which was previously adopted to represent the possibility of increasing aggregate output at 
constant prices). A crucial difference between this “augmented” curve and Keynes’ function or the 
horizontal aggregate supply curve is that the disappointment of expectations is unambiguously, 
though only implicitly, included in it.  
The implicit non-ambiguity of this inclusion may be clarified by cross-examining the 
contributions by Phelps (1967, 1968, 1970), Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1972, 1973). Starting 
from the context of imperfect information (Stigler, 1961) and of incomplete knowledge (Hayek, 
1937) captured in their “island parable” (Phelps et al., 1970)21, these authors proceed by explaining 
the impact of shocks, say an unanticipated monetary expansion, on output and employment. Given 
this context and given the crucial distinction between the initial and final effects of the disturbance, 
these authors trace the former effects to the misperceptions by which individuals (whether 
households or firms), constrained as they are by the information available on their own island, react 
to the disturbance. If it comes to a monetary expansion, these misperceptions consist in 
misinterpreting the (unavoidable) rise of absolute prices induced by the expansion for the 
(impossible) rise of the relative price of each of the goods to be produced. The joint outcome of the 
wrong solution given by imperfectly informed individuals to this “signal extraction problem” is a 
decrease in the level of unemployment and an increase in the volume of aggregate output22. This 
increase can be depicted by a curve sloping upward in the P,Q plane and known as the surprise 
aggregate supply curve. But it should more properly be called the misperceptions-augmented 
aggregate supply curve. For it is true that both expressions are made equally ambiguous by the fact 
that, when surprises occur or misperceptions are revealed, the curve stops sloping upwards. But the 
clear distinction between the initial and the final effects of the disturbance on which this curve is 
                                                 
21 According to the “island parable”, goods are supposed to be produced on different islands by firms and workers 
whose knowledge is limited by the “interisland” obstruction to the flow of information. In such a context it may well 
happen that money wages and money prices do increase while real wages and relative prices actually decrease in each 
island with the result that employment and output mistakenly increase across all the islands. 
 
22 It is interesting to note that in his Nobel Lecture Lucas (1996) regards the solution of this problem as the key for 
coming to grips with Hume’s “double standard” or conflicting ideas (on what was to be called the neutrality of money) 
in his two essays Of Money and Of Interest. For there are passages in these essays in which Hume argues for the 
neutrality of money as well as passages in which he argues for the opposite. The solution suggested by Lucas for this 
outward contradiction is that what Hume has in mind in the neutrality passages are the final or long-period effects of a 
monetary expansion whereas what he has in mind in the non-neutrality passages are the initial or short-period effects of 
the same expansion, captured as they are in what is called above the misperceptions-augmented aggregate supply curve. 
 
 15
built makes it possible to separate the expectations that form in individual minds at the beginning of 
the process (when no one knows whether they are doomed to fail) and the disappointments that are 
enforced upon these very minds by the time the process comes to an end. What makes it worthwhile 
to dub this curve the misperceptions-augmented aggregate supply curve in a way similar to the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve is that along both curves people are subject to errors in time, 
i.e. to errors committed at the beginning and realized at the end of a period rather than to the 
surprises they experience at a point of time (a lottery ticket may provide a surprise without its 
purchase being ever considered a mistake). The essential difference between the two curves, once it 
is acknowledged that the disturbance is to force unemployment in one case and aggregate output in 
the other below or above their “natural” levels, is that the expectations ruling at the beginning of the 
process stem from the neglect, in the former case, and from the misinterpretation, in the latter, of 
what is happening (or going to happen) in the actual economy.  
This simply means that the process set in motion in the two cases, beginning with a given 
set of expectations and ending after a certain time lag into a related set of disappointments, is 
nothing but a process of errors in time: when errors are realized and disappointments take place, 
both curves, however different the planes in which they are drawn, shift upwards and tend equally 
towards a long-run (full-information) vertical shape consistent with the equilibrium (natural) levels 
of employment and output23. 
 
II.3. The policy ineffectiveness proposition 
If one assumes that the expectations ruling at the beginning of a period are formed on the 
basis of the whole information available at that moment by agents who neither ignore nor 
misperceive what is happening, it follows that the shocks discussed in the previous sections can 
have no impact on real magnitudes either along the expectations-augmented Phillips curve or along 
the misperceptions-augmented aggregate supply curve. Since, under this assumption, the very 
possibility of errors in time disappears along with the difference between the initial and final effects 
of the disturbance, the two curves acquire immediately, i.e. as soon as the shock takes place, their 
full-information vertical shape and are accordingly consistent with the REH. It should be noted, 
however, that the REH is made up of two components: one consists in assuming that expectations 
are formed on the basis of the whole information available at a particular moment; the other consists 
in adding to, and drawing from, this perception the resulting predictions of the theory. The former 
                                                 
23 It may be of interest to note that, when Phelps came to present the neutrality of money as a feature to be observed “if 
and when firms and workers formed correct expectations” (of money wages and money prices) except that they “have 
no way of perceiving such neutrality at the start” (2007, p.546; first italics Phelps', second italics added), he made use 
of the same expression (“correct expectations”) that we saw above to be used by Hayek while conveying the idea of 
expectations resulting from  the whole set of existing information. 
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component may be said to convey the REH in its “weak” dimension, the latter in its “strong” 
dimension.  
The usefulness of splitting the REH into these dimensions becomes clear when it comes to 
the so-called “policy ineffectiveness proposition” (Sargent and Wallace, 1975, 1976). According to 
this proposition, the mere announcement of a policy measure, say an expansionary monetary policy, 
is “digested” into the economy in the sense that agents are able to anticipate all the consequences of 
the new measure at the very moment, or even before, the measure is enacted24. The resulting 
“super-neutrality of money” (a feature by which money is regarded as neutral not only in the long 
run –i.e. in a run long enough for errors in time to be perceived and expectations to be revised- but 
also in the short run –i.e. in a run never too short to keep agents from perceiving what is going to 
happen) signifies that central banks can affect employment and output levels only at the cost of 
creating illusions and disappointments. It is here that the “weak” and “strong” REH come into the 
picture. For not only is the REH, being forward-looking in both of its dimensions, more suitable 
than the EEH and the AEH for evaluating the future impact of current policies (particularly of new 
policies). It also provides, when considered in its strong dimension, the further advantage resulting 
from the agents’ ability to draw the predictions of the theory underlying those policies. The fact is 
that this ability boils down to nothing once the expected outcome of particular policies is separated 
from the future conditions of the economy to be affected by these very policies. The snag is that 
between the expected outcome of a policy measure (whatever the model on the strength of which 
this outcome has been expected) and the future condition of the economy lies the flow of historical 
time. This is, as argued above, the “main crux” not only of dynamic theory but also of Keynes’, 
Hayek’s and Hicks’ contributions to this theory. The complications raised by historical time can be 
easily removed when it comes to modelling an abstract economy. But they cannot when it comes to 
evaluating the future impact of particular shocks or policies on the economies of the real world. For 
not only does that flow add ever new complexities to the complexities that normally afflict these 
economies or the theories designed to understand them. It also brings forth novelties that these 
theories, let alone the resulting economic policies, are unable to predict or to overcome25. 
                                                 
24 Closely linked to the policy ineffectiveness proposition is 1) the so-called ‘Lucas critique’ (whereby the parameters of 
the macroeconometric models used for framing policies cannot incorporate also the changes in expectations originated 
by these policies); 2) the call for monetary rules (whereby central banks should refrain from “fooling” the people about 
what they are going to do or where the economy is going to go); 3) the issues of central bank credibility (whereby 
central banks cannot “fool” the people more than once) and of time inconsistency (whereby the “fooling” by central 
banks or governments consists first in announcing a certain rule and than in reaping the impact on real magnitudes of 
“cheating” with it). 
 
25 This applies to any kind of policy measure or policy rule as well as to the repercussions of any shock (whether 
exogenous or endogenous, monetary or real) in a multiple-period economy. Some neglect of the role of surprises in 
altering or reverting the fluctuations resulting from “real” shocks (which are by themselves a source of surprises) can be 
detected in the wave of “real business cycle” models from its inception (Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long and Plosser, 
1983) to some later overviews (Prescott, 2006; Rebelo, 2007). On real business cycle models as “one of the ways 
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Concluding remarks 
A bird’s eye view of how the disappointment of expectations has entered the theory of 
fluctuations from the years of high theory to the more recent years of rational expectations brings to 
mind Robertson’s vision of the hunted hare, i.e. that “if you stand in the same place, or nearly the 
same place, it can be relied upon to come around to you in a circle”. For, if one compares the theory 
developed in the latter with that developed in the former years, one may realize that the weight and 
noise of the hare (the terminology, size and diversification of literature) have hugely increased 
while the diameter of the circle covered (the scope of literature) has under some respects shrunk in 
front of a motionless hunter (the authors of the years of high theory). The mismatch between the 
swelling of the hare and the shrinking of the circle seems to be at the roots of the demise of the 
REH and REH-based models after their peak in the 1980s and 1990s. Apart from the crises that 
have struck the world economy ever since26, a number of analytical reasons can be provided to 
account for such a demise.  
The most general reason seems to be the tendency (somehow shared by Shackle himself) to 
confuse the scope and limits of General Equilibrium Theory with the scope and limits of the 
Economics of Uncertainty and Expectations (Meacci, 2009); or, in Hicks’ terms (Hicks, 1976), the 
inability to separate the economics of time (or of no time at all) from the economics in time; or, in 
Hayek’s terms (Hayek, 1933, 1937, 1941), the logic of equilibrium (which is out of time) and the 
logic of fluctuations (which are in time); or, in still different terms,  the inability to grasp that 
decisions taken in historical time are “self-destructive” and that the learning process is at all times 
“eating its own heart” (Shackle, 1969). All these insights underlie the argument, drawn above from 
the achievements of the years of high theory, against the confusion between the expected or 
deducted outcome of a particular policy and the future condition of the economy as such. 
Another reason can be drawn from the tendency of the years of rational expectations to 
neglect Keynes’s distinction between short-term and long-term expectations as well as Hayek’s 
remarks on the difference between the actual behaviour of agents and the forecasts by model 
builders. As for Keynes, we have seen above that aggregate investment is more affected by the 
sudden revision of long-term expectations than by the slow and gradual changes of their short-term 
counterparts (which might indeed be modelled according to a “weak” REH or even to the AEH, for 
                                                                                                                                                                  
general equilibrium theory can contribute to applied economics” and on their implicit similarity with REH-based 
models (as another way to reach the same result), see Lucas (2007). On the more general relation between “General 
Equilibrium Theory” and the “Economics of Uncertainty and Expectations”, see the following section.  
 
26 For an early example of the rising scepticism about the power of modern macroeconomic theory to comprehend the 
most recent crises and recessions, see Leijonhufvud (2009) and Lawson (2009). 
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it is sensible for producers to base their expectations on the “most recent realized results”: 1936, 
p.51). As for Hayek, his warning against confusing the information given to the “observing 
economist” with the information given to the “persons whose behavior we try to explain” (1937, 
p.6) reflects the more general distinction, discussed above, between “correct” and “incorrect” 
expectations (depending on whether they are or are not compatible in the current period) and, in 
case of “incorrect” expectations, the associated distinction between “endogenous” and “exogenous” 
disturbances or, as we saw above, between “justified” and “sheer” errors. The distinction between 
“correct” and “incorrect” expectations and the possibility of “justified” errors may be used in 
support of Phelp’s critique of the REH in that people have not only to form expectations of other 
peoples’ expectations but also to choose the “true” model among the plurality of models available 
for processing existing information (Frydman and Phelps, 1983, Phelps, 2003, 2007; Frydman and 
Goldberg, 2007).  
A third reason for the changing shape of the hare-and-circle image may be the recent neglect 
for an aspect of modern economies which occupied centre stage in the years of high theory. This 
relates to the “Jevonian interval” which makes economies to enjoy today the fruits of investments 
made in a distant or very distant past as well as to carry out today investments the fruits of which 
will be enjoyed in a distant or very distant future. These economies are, in other terms, fixed-capital 
economies. The heavy use of fixed-capital implies that the disappointment of expectations 
(especially the expectations of entrepreneurs) should play a greater role in the theory and events of 
modern fluctuations than it used to do in the past. Yet, while the authors of the years of high theory 
highlighted, however differently, the devastating impact that the miscoordination of plans on saving 
and investment exert on the “Jevonian interval”, the authors of the years of rational expectations 
have rather overlooked this impact and have focused instead on the oscillations of output and 
employment around their “natural” levels as if these levels were not subject in their turn to 
fluctuations and to both kinds of miscoordination.  
A further reason for the changing emphasis of the literature may lie in the fact that, by 
collapsing the future into the present, the “strong” REH has pushed the theory in an essentially 
similar, though apparently opposite, direction relative to the one undertaken by the two hypotheses 
(the EEH and the AEH) which it was meant to replace and which rather consist in collapsing the 
present into the past. In any case, the weak dimension of the REH reminds us not only that the 
whole information set given to agents today may be turned by the flow of historical time into a 
completely different set tomorrow; but also that this tomorrow may come much earlier than the 
“investment period” has been completed or capital has returned to its point of departure in the 
sphere of its circulation. The result of these “exogenous” disturbances is that rational expectations, 
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including the expectations that rule in Hicks’ “Futures Economy”, are subject to “sheer” errors, to 
say the least, and therefore to disappointment as much as any other kind of expectation.  
This brings us back to the beginning of the years of rational expectations as a step that lies 
below the step reached in the years of high theory. The inferiority of this step is due to the habit of 
focusing on the mechanism of expectations formation as a topic more relevant than the 
consequences exerted by the disappointment of expectations, whatever the mechanism of their 
formation, on the capital structure of the economy and on the levels of employment and output 
associated with this structure. 
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